Ethics and the Forensic Scientist in Wildlife Cases

In most jurisdictions, an expert witness's primary duty is to the court, not to the party that has retained them. This rule exists to prevent experts from becoming hired guns who tailor conclusions to whoever pays. For human forensic scientists working in government crime laboratories, the rule is explicit and enforced through accreditation frameworks, quality assurance systems, and case review. For wildlife forensic scientists, the infrastructure is thinner.

When a scientist is employed by a conservation NGO, the agency's mandate is conservation, and successful prosecutions are part of that mandate. The pressure toward a favourable result can operate through case selection (sending only strong cases to the lab), report review (asking scientists to soften caveats), or framing (briefing scientists on the prosecution theory before analysis begins). Each mechanism can bias results without any individual acting in bad faith.

The SWFS code of ethics directly addresses this by requiring members to report all findings, including those that are exculpatory or that undermine the prosecution's case, with the same rigour as incriminating ones. A scientist who finds that a sample does not match the protected species, or that the match probability is lower than the investigator hoped, must say so clearly in the report. The SWFS code also requires scientists to refuse requests to alter or omit findings to suit an anticipated legal strategy.

Wildlife investigations, especially those targeting organised trafficking networks, frequently rely on confidential informants. Intelligence from these sources may explain why particular items were seized, why specific suspects are under surveillance, or why a particular shipment was flagged as suspicious. The forensic scientist is sometimes briefed on this intelligence as part of the case context.

The ethical and legal problem is that intelligence is not evidence: it cannot be tested, challenged, or disclosed to the defence without potentially endangering a source. If a forensic report refers, even implicitly, to intelligence by saying something like 'consistent with known trafficking routes through this region,' that reference may constitute disclosure of a protected source or it may prejudice the analysis by revealing assumptions baked in before the science was done.

• Keep intelligence and analysis separate: the case file the scientist works from should contain only the physical evidence, chain of custody, and the analytical question. Intelligence should not appear in any document the scientist creates.
• Disclose to legal team early: if the scientist knows something from intelligence that is relevant to interpreting a result, tell the lawyer before the report is finalised, not in the witness box. The lawyer can then make the disclosure decision.
• Do not let intelligence direct interpretation: a population assignment result should be reported as the data shows it, not rounded toward the population the intelligence says the sample should come from.

These rules are easier to state than to follow during an active investigation where investigators and scientists share offices and regular briefings. Building a formal information barrier between the intelligence function and the laboratory function, even in small organisations, is worth the administrative cost.

Wildlife crime is disproportionately concentrated in countries where governance is weak and where enforcement agencies may themselves be compromised. A wildlife forensic scientist deployed by an international organisation to assist local enforcement, or working as a consultant to a national wildlife authority, may discover that case files are being shared with trafficking suspects, that results are being altered after submission, or that samples are going missing before analysis.

The SWFS code of ethics requires scientists to report improper conduct through an independent channel. In practice, identifying that channel in a country where the normal reporting chain is compromised requires advance planning. International organisations that conduct wildlife forensic work in high-corruption environments typically establish the following safeguards.

1. Dual custody of case files
   A copy of every case file is held outside the local jurisdiction, either with the international partner organisation or encrypted in secure remote storage, from the moment the case is opened.
2. Direct reporting channel to international partner
   The scientist has a named contact at an independent organisation they can reach outside the local management chain if they observe improper conduct. This channel is established before deployment, not improvised after a problem arises.
3. Chain-of-custody documentation that the scientist controls
   The scientist maintains their own copy of sample intake and transfer records, independent of agency systems, so that any post-submission alteration of the official record is detectable.
4. Limit single-analyst exposure
   Cases that could result in significant prosecutions should have at least two scientists reviewing results, preferably from different institutional affiliations, so that pressure on one individual does not eliminate oversight.

Scientific openness is a foundational norm. Reference databases, population assignment methods, and DNA barcoding protocols should be published so that courts can assess them, other scientists can critique them, and defence experts can check the work. Withheld methods cannot be properly challenged in court, which is exactly the argument defence attorneys use to get results excluded under Daubert.

Wildlife forensic data has an operational dimension that most laboratory science does not. If a population assignment study reveals that tigers from a specific population in India can be distinguished from tigers from Myanmar based on particular microsatellite alleles, publishing those discriminatory alleles in full tells traffickers precisely which markers they need to obscure, which geographic labels to fake, and which laundering routes remain undetected. The same information that makes the method scientifically transparent makes it operationally vulnerable.

The community's emerging consensus, reflected in SWFS guidance and in papers from the UNODC and TRAFFIC, is to separate the scientific method from the operational parameters. The method, the markers used, and the general principles of the analysis should be published in full. The specific population sampling locations, the exact allele frequencies in the current operational database, and the discriminatory thresholds that investigators use to flag suspect shipments can be kept from public release until the investigation cycle that relies on them is complete. This separation maintains scientific integrity for the court while protecting the operational value of the tool.

A wildlife forensic scientist who developed the barcoding reference database used to identify the species in the current case has a potential conflict: their reputation benefits if the method succeeds. A scientist employed part-time by a conservation organisation that is also providing campaign funding for the prosecution has a financial conflict. Neither is disqualifying, but both must be disclosed in the report and in the witness box if asked.

The SWFS code requires members to disclose all relevant interests. This includes financial relationships with parties to the case, prior publications that express a view on the method or the species in question, and prior public statements about the case or the defendant. Courts in most jurisdictions require the same disclosure through their rules on expert evidence. A conflict that surfaces under cross-examination after non-disclosure is far more damaging to credibility than the same conflict disclosed upfront would have been.

• Prior publications: if you wrote the paper describing the method being used, say so, and ensure the report cites it accurately.
• Funding relationships: grant funding from an organisation with a stake in the outcome should be declared, even if the funding predates the case.
• Prior public statements: tweets, conference presentations, or media interviews where the scientist expressed a view on the case, the defendant, or the trafficking network in question must be disclosed.
• Role in investigation: if the scientist also assisted in the investigation before the forensic analysis began, this dual role should be explicitly noted.